Abstract. Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects.
Introduction
Situations exist in which agents choose a subset from a set of objects. For example, existing members of a club choose new members from a list of candidates, and city council members choose public projects to carry out from a list. Barberà et al. (1991) initiate to model these situations and axiomatically examine a rule (or a social choice function) that maps each preference profile to a subset of objects. They first assume that agents' preferences satisfy separability, which requires that an object e is preferred to the null outcome if and only if any set of candidates including e is preferred to that set subtracting e. We refer to the class of separable preferences as the separable domain. Barberà et al. (1991) establish that on the separable domain, a class of rules called "voting by committees" satisfies "strategy-proofness" and "ontoness," and only this class satisfies those requirements. Strategy-proofness, which is one of the most frequently employed properties for incentive compatibility, requires that no agent can be better off by misrepresenting her true preference whatever preferences other agents may have. Ontoness, which is recognized as an minimal requirement for agent sovereignty, requires that any subset of objects can be an outcome for some preference profile. Thus, their result is positive in the sense that the class of voting by committees includes a variety of rules, all of which satisfy both requirements. Their model and result are followed in various studies. 1 The larger the domain of rules, the greater the variety of situations to which the results can be applied. Thus, once we obtain a positive result on some domain, we wish to enlarge the domain as long as the positive result holds. However, in this model, Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite's (1975) theorem implies that if the domain is unrestricted, no rule other than trivial ones such as dictatorships satisfies strategy-proofness and ontoness. A natural question then arises: (i) how large can the domain be while the class of voting by committees satisfies strategy-proofness and ontoness? Since the class of voting by committees includes trivial rules such as a dictatorship, which satisfy both requirements on the unrestricted domain, this question is qualified as: (i*) how large can the domain be while a nontrivial voting by committees satisfies strategy-proofness and ontoness? Barberà et al. (1991) themselves address this problem, and establish that the separable domain is a maximal domain where voting by "no-vetoer" committees satisfies strategy-proofness. 2 No-vetoer is a condition that excludes trivial rules such as dictatorships.
It says that no agent has a veto power, and is sufficient for ontoness. 3 Note that in the search for maximal domains, we need not restrict rules to a specific class of rules such as voting by committees, a priori, as there may be other interesting rules. Restricting rules to voting by committees in the search for maximal domains might make the maximal domains unnecessarily small. This is why we search for maximal domains without restricting the 1 See, for example, Barberà et al. (1993) , Shimomura (1996) , Ju (2003 Ju ( , 2005 , Berga et al. (2004 Berga et al. ( , 2006 , and Nehring and Puppe (2007) .
2 In fact, the rule employed by Barberà et al. (1991) is voting by no-vetoer and "no-dummy" committees. No-dummy is employed to make all agents' domains equal. In this paper, we omit this condition since we assume exogenously that all agents' domains are the same. Similar types of the maximal domain problem for various rules are studied by Serizawa (1995) , Barberà et al. (1999), and Berga (2002) for a generalized median voter scheme; Barbie et al. (2006) and Vorsatz (2008) for Borda's rule; and Sanver (2009) for the plurality rule.
3 No-vetoer is employed in various studies including Repullo (1987) , Maskin (1999) , and Berga and Serizawa (2000) .
rules to voting by committees. We generalize the above question (i*) as: (ii) how large can the domain be while there exists a nontrivial rule satisfying strategy-proofness and ontoness ? Berga and Serizawa (2000) study this general maximal domain problem (ii) in the model where the set of alternatives is a continuous line. Many authors study this type of maximal domain problem in various models, including Ching and Serizawa (1998), Massó and Neme (2001 , 2004 ), Ehlers (2002 , and Mizobuchi and Serizawa (2006) . However, no author has investigated the general maximal domain problem in the original multi-object choice model by Barberà et al. (1991) .
In this paper, we establish that the separable domain is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer. Even though we seek a larger domain than the separable domain by not specifying from voting by committees, this result states that they coincide. As we discuss the details in the Appendix, the general maximal domain problem in the multi-object choice model requires us to develop a much more complex proof procedure than in the previous literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the details of the model. Section 3 states the main theorem. Section 4 notes some remaining questions and concludes.
The Appendix includes the proof for the main theorem.
Preliminaries
Let N ≡ {1, · · · , n} be the set of agents (or voters). Assume n ≥ 3. 4 A coalition is a subset I of N , and let #I denote the number of agents in I. Let K ≡ {1, · · · , k} be the set of objects.
Let Z denote the set of alternatives that are the vertices of a k-dimensional hypercube; that is, Z ≡ k e=1 Z e , where for all e ∈ K, Z e ≡ {0, 1}. Given z ∈ Z and e ∈ K, z e = 0 represents that the object e is not selected and z e = 1 represents that the object e is selected. 5 We endow Z with the L 1 -norm. That is, for every y, z ∈ Z,
Given y, z ∈ Z, the box containing y and z is defined as B(y, z) ≡ {x ∈ Z : ||y − z|| = ||y − x|| + ||x − z||}.
Preferences are complete, transitive, and asymmetric binary relations over Z. Generic preferences without links to a specific agent are denoted by P 0 , P 0 ,P 0 , and so on. Agent i's preferences are denoted by P i , P i ,P i , and so on. Let D U denote the set of all preferences, and we call D U the universal domain. Given P 0 ∈ D U , let τ (P 0 ) ∈ Z be such that for all z ∈ Z\{τ (P 0 )}, τ (P 0 ) P 0 z. We call τ (P 0 ) the top for P 0 . A preference profile P ≡ (P 1 , . . . , P n ) ∈ D n U is an n-tuple of preferences. For i, j ∈ N , let (P i , P −i ) ∈ D n U denote the preference profile obtained from P by replacing P i with P i , (P j , P i , P −{i,j} ) ∈ D n U denote the 4 In the following investigation, we impose "no-vetoer" on the rule. This property is not meaningful if there are only two agents.
5 Our representation of an alternative follows Barberà et al. (1993) rather than Barberà et al. (1991) .
profile obtained from (P i , P −i ) by replacing P j with P j , and so on. Given a coalition I ⊆ N ,
U denote a #I-tuple of preferences associated with I, and The next property of preference has an important role in this paper.
Separability. For all y, z ∈ Z such that y = z and y ∈ B(z, τ (P 0 )), y P 0 z.
Let D S denote the set of separable preferences. We call D S the separable domain.
We introduce several basic properties of a rule. The first prevents agents from gaining by misrepresenting their true preferences. The second says that any alternative can be an outcome.
The third forbids the rule from giving any agent an extreme decisive power. The fourth forbids the rule from giving any agent an extreme veto power.
Strategy-proofness. For all P ∈ D n , all i ∈ N , and allP i ∈ D\{P i },
Ontoness. For all z ∈ Z, there exists P ∈ D n such that f (P ) = z.
No-dictator. There is no i ∈ N such that for all P ∈ D n , f (P ) = τ (P i ).
No-vetoer.
There is no z ∈ Z, i ∈ N , and P i ∈ D such that for all
If f fails strategy-proofness, f is said to be manipulable. Further, we say that agent i
No-vetoer is equivalent to that for all i ∈ N , all z ∈ Z, and all P i ∈ D, there exists P −i ∈ D n−1 such that f (P ) = z. Also note that no-vetoer implies both ontoness and no-dictator.
Next, we introduce a class of rules, which Barberà et al. (1991) call "voting by committees,"
that plays an important role in our paper. A coalition is said to be "winning" for an object e if it has the power to have the object e selected. Voting by committees is a rule generated by specifying the class of winning coalitions for each object. We assume that for each object, (1) the empty coalition is not winning, (2) the set of all agents is winning, and (3) larger coalitions have more power.
Set of winning coalitions W e 2 N for an object e ∈ K.
(1) ∅ / ∈ W e , (2) N ∈ W e , and (3) for all I, I ∈ 2 N such that I ∈ W e and I ⊆ I , I ∈ W e .
Given W e , let W e ≡ {I ∈ W e : for all i ∈ I, I\{i} ∈ W e }, which we call the set of minimal winning coalitions associated with W e . Let a winning coalition system W ≡ {W e } k e=1 . A voting by committees is a rule associated with a winning coalition system such that each object e is selected in the outcome if and only if the set of agents whose top alternative contains e belongs to the set of winning coalitions for e.
Voting by committees. There exists a winning coalition system W such that for all P ∈ D n and all e ∈ K,
The following is the main result by Barberà et al. (1991) .
Theorem 1 (Barberà et al., 1991) . A rule on the separable domain satisfies strategyproofness and ontoness if and only if it is a voting by committees. 6 Immediately, we obtain the characterization result by using strategy-proofness and no-vetoer on the separable domain as a corollary of Theorem 1, which must be a strict subset of the set of voting by committees. The characterized rules are defined by a winning coalition system and additionally satisfy (1) any sole agent cannot be a winning coalition, and (2) any coalition with n − 1 members is a winning coalition.
Set of no-vetoer winning coalitions W e 2 N for an object e ∈ K. (1) For all i ∈ N, {i} ∈ W e , (2) for all i ∈ N, N \{i} ∈ W e , and (3) for all I, I ∈ 2 N such that I ∈ W e and I ⊆ I ,
Voting by no-vetoer committees. There exists a no-vetoer winning coalition system W such that for all P ∈ D n and all e ∈ K, f e (P ) = 1 ⇐⇒ {i ∈ N : τ e (P i ) = 1} ∈ W e Remark 1. A rule on the separable domain satisfies strategy-proofness and no-vetoer if and only if it is voting by no-vetoer committees.
Because of Theorem 1, we only need to check that (i) voting by no-vetoer committees is certain to satisfy no-vetoer, and (ii) if a rule is voting by committees but not voting by novetoer committees, it violates no-vetoer. To see (i), by condition (1) of the sets of no-vetoer winning coalitions, any agent i solely does not have veto power against an alternative z ∈ K with z e = 0. Similarly, by condition (2), any agent i solely cannot veto an alternative z with z e = 1. To see (ii), if condition (1) for some e ∈ K is violated, then an agent i has a veto power to an alternative z with z e = 1. Similarly, if condition (2) is violated, an agent i has veto power against an alternative z with z e = 1.
The Main Result
In this section, we first define the precise concept of the "maximal domain" following Ching and Serizawa (1998) , and then derive the main result. Note that given a list of properties, there is a possibility that multiple maximal domains exist. Now we can state the main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 2. The separable domain is a maximal domain for strategy-proofness and no-vetoer. 7
Note that there can be another maximal domain that does not contain the separable domain for these properties. However, since separability in preferences is quite important and considered in almost all articles studying this model, this result should be at least one of the most interesting maximal domain results for this model.
In the proof, placed in the Appendix, we fix a domain D such that D S D ⊆ D U , and derive a contradiction when assuming that there exists a rule satisfying the properties of strategyproofness and no-vetoer on D.
Finally in this section, we present an example illustrating that no-vetoer is indispensable for the theorem. This example shows that a maximal domain for strategy-proofness, ontoness, and no-dictator that includes the separable domain is strictly larger than the separable domain.
by committees generated by W. Then f satisfies strategy-proofness, ontoness, and no-dictator but does not satisfy no-vetoer.
By the structure of W 1 , any agent can be a vetoer against alternatives with object 1 chosen.
No-dictator is obviously satisfied. Since f is voting by committees, by Theorem 1, ontoness is satisfied and no agent with a separable preference has an incentive to misrepresent her preference.
If the preference of some agent, say agent i, isP 0 and she represents her true preference, then by the structure of W 1 , the outcome is (0, 0) or (0, 1). In the case of (0, 0), which is agent i's top alternative τ (P 0 ), it is certain that she has no incentive for misrepresentation. In the case of (0, 1), by W, it follows that the top alternative of one of the other two agents is (0, 1) or (1, 1).
Then the outcome that agent i can obtain by misrepresenting her preference is either (0, 1) or (1, 1). Since she prefers (0, 1) to (1, 1), she has no incentive for misrepresentation. Hence f satisfies strategy-proofness.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have established that the separable domain is a maximal domain for the properties of strategy-proofness and no-vetoer. However, this result does not exclude the possibility that there are other interesting maximal domains for the same properties. We close the article by discussing the possibility of the uniqueness of meaningful maximal domains.
When we model a situation, we make assumptions on preferences that are suitable for it. Unless domains include a minimal variety of natural preferences, the results on the domains cannot be applied to interesting situations and become meaningless. Although generally maximal domains are not unique, a maximal domain including small and natural subdomains may be unique. For example, Barberà et al. (1991) show the uniqueness of a maximal domain that includes a subdomain, called a "minimally rich domain" and on which voting by no-vetoer committees satisfies strategy-proofness. A domain D is minimally rich if for any z ∈ Z, there is a unique P 0 ∈ D such that τ (P 0 ) = z.
Note that Barberà et al.'s (1991) result is a statement on a restricted class of rules, the class of voting by committees although it claims the uniqueness of the maximal domain for strategyproofness. In the model where the set of alternatives is a continuous line, without restricting the class of rules a priori, Berga and Serizawa (2000) show the uniqueness of a maximal domain including a minimally rich domain for strategy-proofness and no-vetoer. Therefore, the following is an interesting open question: is the separable domain a unique maximal domain including a minimally rich domain for strategy-proofness and no-vetoer?
The previous studies that obtain unique maximal domains without restricting the class of rules a priori employ characterization results of rules satisfying lists of properties on subdomains.
For example, in establishing the uniqueness of maximal domains, Berga and Serizawa (2000) employ the fact that on a minimally rich domain, the class of rules called "generalized median voter schemes" is a unique class of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and ontoness. Accordingly, to establish the uniqueness of a maximal domain in the multi-object choice model, it is important whether or not the class of voting by committees is the unique class of rules for strategy-proofness on a minimally rich domain. However, since some strategy-proof rules on a minimally rich domain are not voting by committees, we need to develop new proof techniques to solve the above open question.
Appendix
In this Appendix, the proof of Theorem 2 is given. In this Appendix, when a specific preference P 0 is given beforehand, P i is employed to denote agent i's preference such that P i = P 0 unless mentioned explicitly. First, we introduce a remark that plays a quite important role in the proof.
Suppose that a rule f : D n → Z satisfies strategy-proofness and no-vetoer. Then there exists a voting by no-vetoer committees g such that for all P ∈ D n S , f (P ) = g(P ).
We obtain this remark immediately from Remark 1 and that f restricted to D S must satisfy strategy-proofness and no-vetoer.
Suppose, on the contrary, that there is a rule f on D n , satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer. We derive a contradiction. LetP 0 ∈ D\D S . Let τ ≡ τ (P 0 ).
A is the set of pairs for whichP 0 violates the condition of separability.
A * is the set of pairs in A for which the distances between z and τ are minimal. ByP 0 ∈ D\D S , A = ∅, and so A * = ∅. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. There exists (y, z) ∈ A * such that ||z − y|| = 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose, on the contrary, that for all (y, z) ∈ A * , ||z − y|| > 1. Let (y, z) ∈ A * . By ||z − y|| > 1, there is x ∈ B(z, τ ) such that ||z − x|| = 1, and y ∈ B(x, τ ). If zP 0 x, then x ∈ B(z, τ ) implies (x, z) ∈ A * , and so ||z − x|| = 1 contradicts the hypothesis. If xP 0 z, then zP 0 y implies xP 0 y, and so y ∈ B(x, τ ) implies (y, x) ∈ A. Since x ∈ B(z, τ ) and
Hereafter, let (y, z) ∈ A * be such that ||z − y|| = 1. By relabeling coordinates, we have
where a ∈ K is such that 2 ≤ a ≤ k − 1.
Note that x 1 = y and x a = τ . Also note that since (y, z) ∈ A * and ||z − y|| = 1, τP 0 x a−1P 0 · · ·P 0 x 2P 0 y. Let c ∈ {2, · · · , a} be such that x cP 0 z and zP 0 x c−1 . Let d be the maximal element of {c, · · · , a} such that I d = I c . Let r ≡ r c (= r d ) and x * ≡ x d . Note that if I c = I a , i.e., if r c = r a , then d = a and x * = τ , and that if I c I a , i.e., if r c < r a , then d < a, x * = τ , I d I d+1 , and
for some e ∈ {a + 1, · · · , k}, x e = 0}.
Assume that for all x ∈ B(z, τ ) and all x ∈ E, x P z 0 x . Assume that for all x ∈ B(z, τ ) and all x ∈ E, x P y 0 x , and for all w ∈ B(z, τ ) such that w 1 = 1 and all w ∈ B(z, τ ) such that w 1 = 0, w P y 0 w . Assume that for all x ∈ B(z, τ ) and all x ∈ E, x P τ 0 x , and P τ 0 andP 0 are equivalent over B(z, τ )\{z}. 8 By Remark 2, there exists a voting by no-vetoer committees g : D n S → Z such that for all P ∈ D n S , f (P ) = g(P ). Let W be the no-vetoer winning coalition system associated with g. By relabeling agents, we have I 1 ≡ {1, · · · , q} ∈ W 1 . Note that by condition (2) of the no-vetoer winning coalition, 2 ≤ q ≤ n−1. Given e ∈ {2, · · · , a}, let r e be such that I e ≡ {1, · · · , r e } ∈ W e and I e \{r e } ∈ W e . By relabeling coordinates, we have: I 2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ I a . Then by condition (2) of no-vetoer winning coalitions, 2 ≤ r 2 ≤ · · · ≤ r a ≤ n − 1.
The next two lemmas are frequently used in the following investigation.
Lemma 2. Let e ∈ {2, · · · , a} and s ≤ r e − 1. Let P ∈ D n be such that for all i ≤ s, P i ∈ {P 0 , P τ 0 }, and for all i ≥ s + 1,
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists l ∈ {e, · · · , a} such that x l = 1.
Since f (P ) = x, by the repeated use of strategy-proofness, f (P x {1,··· ,s} , P {s+1,··· ,n} ) = x. Since (P x {1,··· ,s} , P {s+1,··· ,n} ) ∈ D n S , we have
Since s ≤ r e − 1 ≤ r l − 1, {1, · · · , s} ∈ W l . This contradicts g(P x {1,··· ,s} , P {s+1,··· ,n} ) = x and x l = 1.
Lemma 3. Let j ∈ N , P −j ∈ D n−1 , and x ∈ B(z, τ ). Suppose that f (P τ j , P −j ) = x. Then (i) f (P j , P −j ) = x, or (ii) f (P j , P −j ) ∈ E and f (P j , P −j )P 0 x.
Proof of Lemma 3. Note that
x , then agent j manipulates f at (P j , P −j ) via P τ j , contradicting strategyproofness.
Suppose that f (P j , P −j ) ∈ B + x . SinceP 0 and P τ 0 are equivalent on B(z, τ )\{z}, and since xP 0 z implies B + x B(z, τ )\{z},P 0 and P τ 0 are equivalent on B + x . Thus, f (P j , P −j ) ∈ B + x implies that j manipulates f at (P τ j , P −j ) viaP j . This contradicts strategy-proofness. Hence, f (P j , P −j ) = x or f (P j , P −j ) ∈ E. In the latter case, by strategy-proofness, f (P j , P −j )P 0 x.
There are two cases, Cases A and B. Case A is that I 1 ⊆ I d , i.e., q ≤ r. Case B is that
e., r < q. We derive a contradiction in each of the two cases.
Case A.
Step 1. Let 0 ≤ j ≤ r−2. Let f (P {1,··· ,j} , P τ {j+1,··· ,r} , P z
) ∈ E, and f (P {1,··· ,j} , P τ {j+1,··· ,r} , P z
) ∈ E and xP 0 x * .
Proof of Step 1. Since f (P {1,··· ,j} , P τ {j+1,··· ,r} , P z −I d )P 0 x * , d < a, and strategy-proofness, xP 0 x * .
Suppose that x ∈ E, i.e., x ∈ B(z, τ ). By xP 0 x * and x * P 0 z, xP 0 z and so x = z. By x = z, x ∈ B(z, τ )\{z}. Then sinceP 0 satisfies separability on B(z, τ )\{z} and xP 0 x * , x * ∈ B(x, τ ).
, 1, · · · , 1), and since x ∈ B(z, τ ) imply that for all e ∈ {a + 1, · · · , n}, x e = 1, it follows that for some e ∈ {d + 1, · · · , a}, x e = 1. On the other hand, since d + 1 ≤ e implies r d+1 ≤ r e , r = r d < r d+1 implies r ≤ r e − 1. Thus, by Lemma 2, x e = 0. This is a contradiction. Hence, x ∈ E.
Step 2. (i) f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ r , P z
(ii) f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ r , P z
) ∈ E and f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ r , P z
Proof of Step 2. Since (P τ
for all e ∈ {1, · · · , d}, and I d ∈ W e for all e ∈ {d + 1, · · · , a}, we have f (P τ
By first applying Lemma 3, and then r − 2 additional times either Lemma 3 or Step 1, we obtain the statement of this step.
Step 3. f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ r , P z
Proof of Step 3. Suppose that f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ r , P z
We derive a contradiction in three substeps.
Substep 3-1. By
Step 2 and f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ r , P z
and f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ r , P z
Substep 3-2. Let d be the maximal element of {d + 1, · · · , a} such that I d = I d+1 . Let r ≡ r d and x ≡ x d . Note that if I d+1 = I a , i.e., if r d+1 = r a , then d = a and x = τ , and that if I d+1 I a , i.e., if r d+1 < r a , then d < a, x = τ and r d < r d +1 . In this substep, we show that (i) f (P τ {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} ) = x , (ii) f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} )P 0 x , and
for all e ∈ {d + 1, . . . , a}, f (P τ {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} ) = g(P τ {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} ) = x . Thus, we have (i).
Let x ≡ f (P {1,··· ,r −1} , P z {r ,··· ,n} ). In this paragraph, we show x ∈ E. Since f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ r , P z
, and
x * implies that for some e ∈ {d + 1, · · · , a}, x e = 1. Let e ∈ {d + 1, · · · , a} be such that x e = 1. By d + 1 ≤ e, r d+1 ≤ r e . Thus, r ≡ r d = r d+1 implies r − 1 ≤ r e − 1. Accordingly, by Lemma 2, x e = 0. This is a contradiction. Therefore, x ∈ E.
Let y ≡ f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} ). If y = x , then by x ∈ B(z, τ ) and the definition of P z 0 , for all z ∈ E, y P z 0 z . By x ∈ E, this implies that agent r manipulates f at (P {1,··· ,r −1} , P z {r ,··· ,n} ) viaP r . It contradicts strategy-proofness. Thus, y = x . By y = x , and the repeated use of strategy-proofness to (i), we have (ii) f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} ) = y P 0 x . Suppose that y ∈ E. Then, by y = x , y ∈ B(z, τ )\{x }. By y P 0 x , x = τ and so d < a. Note that since x P 0 x * and x * P 0 z, B + x ∪ {x } ⊆ B(z, τ )\{z}. SinceP 0 is separable on B(z, τ )\{z}, it is separable on B + x ∪ {x }. Thus by y P 0 x , x ∈ B(y , τ ). Then since τ ≡ (1, · · · · · · · · · , 1), and
, 1, · · · , 1), for some e ∈ {d + 1, · · · , a}, we have y e = 1. By d + 1 ≤ e, r d +1 ≤ r e . Thus, r ≡ r d < r d +1 ≤ r e , and so r ≤ r e − 1. Therefore, by Lemma 2, y e = 0. This is a contradiction. Thus, f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} ) = y ∈ E. Substep 3-3. As we show in Substep 3-2, f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} )P 0 x and f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} ) ∈ E. Similarly to Substep 3-1, we have d < a. Let d be the maximal element of {d + 1, · · · , a} such that
Then we can repeat the argument of Substep 3-2 by replacing r with r , x * with x and x with x . As a result, we obtain that f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} )P 0 x and f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} ) ∈ E. Repeat the argument. Then, finally, we have that f (P {1,··· ,ra−1} , P z {ra,··· ,n} ) ∈ E. Note that f (P τ {1,··· ,ra} , P z {r a+1 ,··· ,n} ) = g(P τ {1,··· ,ra} , P z {r a+1 ,··· ,n} ) = τ . Thus by the repeated use of strategyproofness, f (P {1,··· ,ra} , P z {r a+1 ,··· ,n} ) = τ . Then agent r a manipulates f at (P {1,··· ,ra−1} , P z {ra,··· ,n} ) viaP ra . It contradicts strategy-proofness. Hence, we have f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ r , P z
Step 4. Let 0 ≤ j ≤ r − 2. Let f (P {1,··· ,j} , P z {j+1,··· ,r−1} , P y r , P z
) ∈ E and f (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P y r , P z
).
(I) If x ∈ B − z , then agent j +1 manipulates f at (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P y r , P z
, which contradicts strategy-proofness.
(II) Suppose that x ∈ B + z . Then by the repeated use of strategy-proofness, f (P x {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P y r , P z
Since x ∈ B + z and zP 0 x c−1 , we have x = z, x c−1 = z, and xP 0 x c−1 . Then sinceP 0 satisfies separability on B(z, τ )\{z}, x c−1 ∈ B(x, τ ). Since
, 1, · · · , 1), and x ∈ B(z, τ ) implies that for all e ∈ {a + 1, · · · , n}, x e = 1, it follows that for some e ∈ {c, · · · , a}, x e = 1. Let e ∈ {c, · · · , a} be such that x e = 1. By c ≤ e, r = r c ≤ r e , and so r − 1 ≤ r e − 1. Therefore, by Lemma 2, x e = 0. This is a contradiction.
Hence, we obtain that x = z or x ∈ E. In the latter case, by strategy-proofness, xP 0 z.
Step 5. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ r − 2. Suppose that f (P {1,··· ,j} , P z {j+1,··· ,r−1} , P y r , P z
by strategy-proofness, xP 0 z. Suppose that x ∈ E. Then by xP 0 z, x ∈ B + z . Then by the same way to case (II) of Step 4, we obtain a contradiction.
Step 6. f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P y r , P z
Proof of Step 6. f (P z {1,··· ,r−1} , P y r , P z
Step 4, and then r − 2 additional times either Step 4 or Step 5, we obtain the statement of this step.
Proof of Case A. By Step 3, we have (1) f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ r , P z
Step 6, we have
) ∈ E. In either (2) or (3), by comparing with (1), agent r manipulates f at (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P y r , P z −I 2 ) via P τ r , which contradicts strategy-proofness.
Case B.
The argument of Case B is parallel to Case A, but for different points. Let h be the maximal element of {d, · · · , a} such that I h ⊆ I 1 , i.e., r h ≤ q. Let x * * ≡ x h . Note that h = a and x * * = τ if and only if r a ≤ q, and that h < a and x * * = τ if and only if r a > q, and that if r a > q, r h ≤ q < r h+1 . Also note that x * * P 0 x * or x * * = x * . Thus x * * P 0 z. Parallel to Steps 1-6, we can show Steps 7-12 below. Their precise proofs are available in the Online Supplementary Note.
Step 7. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ r − 2. Let f (P {1,··· ,j} , P τ {j+1,··· ,q} , P z
) ∈ E and f (P {1,··· ,j} , P τ {j+1,··· ,q} , P z
) ∈ E and f (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P τ {j+2,··· ,q} , P z
Step 8. (i) f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ {r,··· ,q} , P z
) ∈ E and f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1 )P 0 x * * .
Step 9. f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ {r,··· ,q} , P z
Step 10. Let j ∈ {0, · · · , r − 2}. Let f (P {1,··· ,j} , P z {j+1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z
(ii) f (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1
) ∈ E and f (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1 )P 0 z.
Step 11. Let j ∈ {1, · · · , r − 2}. Suppose that f (P {1,··· ,j} , P z {j+1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1
) ∈ E and f (P {1,··· ,j} , P z {j+1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z
) ∈ E and f (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z
Step 12. f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z
Proof of Case B. By
Step 9, we have (4) f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1 ) = x * * . By repeated use of strategy-proofness to (4), we have (5) f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ r , P y {r+1,··· ,q} , P z
Step 12, we have (6) f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z
Note that by the definition of P y 0 , x * * P y 0 z and for all y ∈ E, x * * P y 0 y . Thus in either (6) or (7), by comparing (5), agent r manipulates f at (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1 ) via P τ r , which contradicts strategy-proofness. In this supplementary note, we provide the proofs of Steps 7-12, which are omitted in the main paper because they are parallel to those of Steps 1-6.
Proof of Step 7. Let x ≡ f (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P τ {j+2,··· ,q} , P z
). By f (P {1,··· ,j} , P τ {j+1,··· ,q} , P z
x * * = τ , and by strategy-proofness, xP 0 x * * . By x * * = τ , h < a, and r h ≤ q < r h+1 .
Suppose that x ∈ E, i.e., x ∈ B(z, τ ). By xP 0 x * * and x * * P 0 z, xP 0 z and so x = z. By x = z, x ∈ B(z, τ )\{z}. Then sinceP 0 satisfies separability on B(z, τ )\{z} and xP 0 x * * ,
and since x ∈ B(z, τ ) imply that for all e ∈ {a + 1, · · · , n}, x e = 1, it follows that for some e ∈ {h + 1, · · · , a}, x e = 1. On the other hand, since h + 1 ≤ e implies r h+1 ≤ r e , q < r h+1 implies q ≤ r e − 1. Thus, by Lemma 2, x e = 0. This is a contradiction. Hence, x ∈ E.
) ∈ E and f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ {r,··· ,q} , P z
Proof of Step 8. Since for all e ∈ {1, · · · , h}, I 1 ∈ W e and for all e ∈ {h + 1, · · · , a}, 1 I 1 ∈ W e , we have f (P τ and so r ≤ r e − 1. Therefore, by Lemma 2, y e = 0. This is a contradiction. Therefore, f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} ) = y ∈ E. Substep 9-3. As we show in Substep 9-2, f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} )P 0 x * * and f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} ) ∈ E. Similarly to Substep 9-1, we have h < a. Let h be the maximal element of {h + 1, · · · , a} such that I h = I h +1 . Let r ≡ r h and x * * ≡ x h . Then we can repeat the argument of Substep 9-2 by replacing r with r , x * * with x * * and x * * with x * * .
As a result, we obtain that f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} )P 0 x * * and f (P {1,··· ,r } , P z {r +1,··· ,n} ) ∈ E. Repeat the argument. Then finally, we have that f (P {1,··· ,ra−1} , P z {ra,··· ,n} ) ∈ E. Note that f (P τ {1,··· ,ra} , P z {r a+1 ,··· ,n} ) = g(P τ {1,··· ,ra} , P z {r a+1 ,··· ,n} ) = τ . Thus by the repeated use of strategyproofness, f (P {1,··· ,ra} , P z {r a+1 ,··· ,n} ) = τ . Then agent r a manipulates f at (P {1,··· ,ra−1} , P z {ra,··· ,n} ) viaP ra . It contradicts strategy-proofness.
Hence, we have f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P τ r , P z
Step 10. Let j ∈ {0, · · · , r − 2}. Let f (P {1,··· ,j} , P z {j+1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1 ) = z. Then (i) f (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z
Proof of
Step 10.
Note that Z = {z} ∪ B + z ∪ B − z ∪ E. Let x ≡ f (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z
−I 1
(I) If x ∈ B − z , then agent j + 1 manipulates f at (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1 ) via P z j+1 , which contradicts strategy-proofness.
(II) Suppose that x ∈ B + z . Then by the repeated use of strategy-proofness, f (P x {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P , 1, · · · , 1) and x ∈ B(z, τ ) implies that for all e ∈ {a + 1, · · · , n}, x e = 1, it follows that for some e ∈ {c, · · · , a}, x e = 1. Let e ∈ {c, · · · , a} be such that x e = 1. By c ≤ e, r = r c ≤ r e , and so r − 1 ≤ r e − 1. Therefore, by Lemma 2, x 0 = 0. This is a contradiction.
) ∈ E and f (P {1,··· ,j} , P z {j+1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1 )P 0 z. Then f (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1
) ∈ E and f (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1 )P 0 z .
Proof of
Step 11. Let x ≡ f (P {1,··· ,j+1} , P z {j+2,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z
−I 1
). Since f (P {1,··· ,j} , P z {j+1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1 )P 0 z, by strategy-proofness, xP 0 z. Suppose that x ∈ E.
Then by xP 0 z, x ∈ B + z . Then by the same way to case (II) of Step 10, we obtain a contradiction. .
Step 12. f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1 ) = z or f (P {1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z
Proof of Step 12. By {1, · · · , q} ∈ W 1 and 2 ≤ r, {r, · · · , q} ∈ W 1 . Thus f (P z {1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1 ) = g(P z {1,··· ,r−1} , P y {r,··· ,q} , P z −I 1 ) = z. By first applying
Step 10, and then r − 2 additional times either Step 10 or Step 11, we obtain the statement of this step.
